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Abstract  
Banks entering an emerging market face a lot of uncertainty about the risks 
involved in lending. We use a unique unbalanced panel of nearly 700 short-
term loans made to SMEs in Slovakia between January 2000 and June 2005. 
Of the loans granted, on average 6.0 per cent of the firms defaulted. Several 
probit models and panel probit models show that liquidity and profitability 
factors are important determinants of SMEs defaults, while debt factors are 
less robust. However, we find that above average indebtedness significantly 
increases the probability of default. Moreover, the legal form that 
determines liability has important incentive effects.   
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1. Introduction   
The current trends in the banking markets in the new member states of the European 
Union (EU) may seem puzzling. On the one hand, they are attractive targets for Western 
European banks that now posses most of the banks assets in nearly all the countries of 
this region. Currently, the investments made by foreign banks in these countries pay off, 
and actually generate higher revenues than their activities in their home markets 
(Breyer, 2004). Still, many firms in the new member states complain that access to 
finance represents a major impediment to doing business. SMEs find it particularly 
difficult to get loans. In Eastern Europe, only about 45 per cent of SMEs use external 
finance while 65 per cent of the large firms do so (EBRD, 2005a). This means that, due 
to the lack of financial intermediation, their potential contributions to growth and 
employment are wasted (Bilsen and Konings, 1998, Levine, 2006). Thus, these markets 
can be expected to keep growing in the future provided the firms are credit-worthy. 
On the other hand, fueled by increasing income and positive growth 
expectations, lending has increased significantly (Coricelli et al., 2006). From a 
macroeconomic perspective, however, concerns about a “lending boom” have been 
raised recently (Duenwald et al., 2005).
1 An expansion of credit may increase the 
probability of a banking crisis if, during the credit boom period, the quality of the 
evaluation of credit proposals suffers.  
However, we know little about the default rates of bank loans. Although there is 
evidence on the default and mortality rates of bonds, it is hard to transfer the results in 
this field to corporate loans. The sole study on default of bank loans is on syndicated 
loans to corporate debtors (Altman and Suggitt, 2000). What is still missing is evidence 
of the default pattern of loans to individual firms in a fast growing emerging economy. 3 
What are the typical default rates of loans to SMEs which are not rated? Is there a 
difference in default rates across sectors? Is there a common pattern in the financial 
indicators and the business development of defaulters? What is the role of the incentives 
related to the liability requirements for different legal forms of the SMEs?  
We analyze these issues by using a unique set of data about loans made to around 
700 SMEs in Slovakia between January 2000 and June 2005. We find that the default 
rate among loans made to SMEs was 6.0 per cent. It can also be shown that the 
conditional default probabilities (or marginal mortality rates) are hump shaped, with the 
highest mortality rate reached about three years after the credit approval. The default 
rates clearly differ between industries: in the service sector and in agriculture the default 
rates are above average. Moreover, the default rate is much lower for natural persons 
than for legal bodies. We also provide evidence that lower profitability and lower 
liquidity increase the risk of default. Furthermore, we show that indebtedness increases 
the risk of default only for highly indebted firms.  
The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a survey of the 
literature on loan defaults and derives the predictions to be tested empirically. Section 3 
describes our data set, and Section 4 presents mortality rates for bank loans. Section 5 
analyses factors determining the probability of a default in probit models. The last 
section concludes.  
2.  Determinants of Default Rates and Literature Review  
Our paper is related to the literature on default rates and the problems of asymmetric 
information. Problems of asymmetric information play an important role in financing 
SMEs. These problems - adverse selection and ex ante moral hazard - should be more 
severe in the new member states of the EU. According to the so-called “observed-risk 4 
hypothesis”, banks can observe the firm’s risk ex ante and can adjust the terms of the 
credit contract accordingly so as to adjust pricing to the riskiness of the loan (Blazy and 
Weill, 2006).  
Correspondingly, we concentrate on three areas of default determinants. Firstly, 
the problems of asymmetric information arise for all loans, although these problems 
aggravate as the relative debt level increases. Secondly, however, different legal forms 
may also provide different incentives, which may result in different default 
probabilities. Finally, other variables are also likely to determine the default rates.  
The first relationship is most closely related to our initial motivation with regard 
to financial vulnerability in the new member states. If firms are highly indebted, when 
successful they have to pay a higher proportion of their payoff to the bank. As a result, 
ceteris paribus, the difference between the payoffs for success and failure decreases, and 
so does the incentive to exert effort and/ or invest the loan for the purpose agreed upon 
in the credit contract. This behavior decreases the probability of success. 
 
Hypothesis 1: More highly indebted firms are more likely to default. 
 
The degree of the moral hazard problems depends a lot on the characteristics of 
the firm. If the debtor is fully liable, he internalizes the effect of his investment decision 
on payoffs. In contrast, when the degree of debtor’s liability is restricted, for example, if 
he does not have sufficient assets that can be used as collateral
2 and can be liquidated in 
the case of failure, the debtor repays only in the case of a successful outcome. Of 
course, he has to repay more in the case of success because with failure, the bank gets 5 
no repayment. As a consequence, the incentives of the debtor are distorted if he is not 
(fully) liable (see Bester, 1987, Holmström, 1996, and Hainz, 2003).  
A similar argument applies to strategic default. Suppose that the creditor cannot 
observe the actual outcome of a project. This allows the debtor to claim that his project 
hasfailed (although it was successful) and to keep the return. If the debtor is liable and 
loses assets in the case of failure, the likelihood of strategic default is much lower (see 
Bester, 1994). The debtor’s liability is largely determined by the legal form. On the one 
hand, natural persons are fully liable for their losses. On the other hand, owners can 
limit their liability more easily by incorporating the firm as a legal body. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The higher is the debtor’s liability, the less likely the firm is to default. 
 
Finally, we have to consider other determinants of corporate defaults that were 
discussed in the earlier literature. Loan default is closely related to corporate 
bankruptcy. The causes of bankruptcy are problems in the fields of profitability, 
liquidity and solvency (Altman, 1968). These financial ratios can be used to predict the 
probability of corporate bankruptcy (Altman, 1968; Beaver, 1966).
3  
 
Hypothesis 3: Firms are more likely to default if they are less profitable and less liquid.  
 
The only paper studying default rates of bank loans is Altman and Suggitt 
(2000). They base their analysis on syndicated loans which exceed US$ 100 million, are 
rated and are issued between 1991 and 1996. After a five year period, the cumulative 
default rates are remarkable similar to those of corporate bonds. However, the time 6 
patterns of default differ considerably. Compared to bonds the default rates of loans are 
significantly higher in the first two years. Some more evidence is available on the 
default recovery rates of loans that range between mean values of 65 and 87 per cent in 
developed countries, depending on the data set (Carty et al. 1998; Asarnow and 
Edwards, 1995; Grossman et al., 1997).  
 
3.  Data Description  
We have a unique data set on small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in Slovakia 
between 2000 and 2005. Our data set is from a major commercial bank in Slovakia that  
provided all types of loans in all regions of the country. Lending to the SMEs represents 
an important growth strategy. Similarly to other banks in the region, the bank was 
privatized to a large Western European banking group before the period analyzed here. 
As a result, our analyses are likely to be applicable to other countries of the enlarged 
EU, although we cannot present direct comparisons.  
The anonymous data set is used for an ex post evaluation of the credit risk of 
various types of the SMEs. Our data set consists of two parts. First, we have 
information about whether a SME defaulted on its loan during five partially overlapping 
periods of 18 months, which are starting in January (e.g. the first period being January 
2000 to June 2001, the last period being January 2004 to June 2005). Default companies 
are dropped from the sample after the period in which insolvency occurred. In order to 
preserve a consistency between the time periods, clients who repaid their loans before 
the end of period analyzed were not included in the sample.
4 We include only SMEs 
with double-entry bookkeeping in order to ensure a more reliable and comparable data 
base. 7 
Following the general practice of the financial institutions, we define defaults if 
a loan is written off, or after the delay in repayment exceeds 90 days, or a client is 
classified by the bank as substandard, doubtful or loss-making during the observed 
period. With a few exceptions, the bank terminated the relationships with defaulting 
companies after either eventual repayment of the obligations or the company became 
bankrupt. We do not have any data for recoveries of defaulting companies, which are 
supervised by a specialized unit of the bank. Figure 1 shows that the development of 
credits and defaults during the period analyzed. We can see only a slightly higher 
default rate between January 2002 and June 2003, which corresponded to the business 
cycle in Slovakia. Similarly, we can see a moderate expansion of credits to the SMEs in 
2004 and 2005. This development pattern approximately follows the credit development 
in Slovakia. According to the National Bank of Slovakia (see NBS, 2006), between 
1999 and 2005 the volume of credits to SMEs grew by 1.4 per cent on average. More 
recently, however, this segment expanded by 39 per cent and 19 per cent in 2004 and 
2005, respectively.
5  8 
Figure 1: Development of Loans and Defaults by Reporting Periods  
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This information set on defaults is merged with financial data from the firms’ 
annual balance sheets published in December of the respective year before the reported 
period (e.g. December 1999 is used for the explanation of defaults between January 
2000 and June 2001). All items are reported as shares in total assets or liabilities. Total 
sales indicate the size of the SMEs, and they are also used for the definition of the 
SMEs as being between SKK 30 million (approximately EUR 1 million) and SKK 300 
million (approximately EUR 10 million). The same nominal interval was applied during 
the whole available period, while the average inflation was about 8 per cent annually. 
However, the majority of the reported entities has total sales in the lower range of the 
spectrum. The descriptive statistics for the sales in Table 1 show that there is only weak 
statistical evidence that the size of the defaulting SMEs is larger than that of the whole 
data sample.
6 In particular, the F-test for the equality of means of sales of defaulting and 9 
non-defaulting companies can be rejected only at 10% significance level, while 
variances in the sub-samples are not significantly different.  
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Selected Variables  
 
Total sales 
SKK million 
Bank 
loans
B
Cash and bank 
accounts
A 
Earnings before 
taxation
A
A: Non-default companies   
Mean 100319 0.152 0.298  0.033
Median 78046 0.117 0.146  0.019
Max 298431 0.853 27.727  0.488
Min. 30115 -0.190 -0.237  -0.321
Std. Dev.  65584 0.125 0.832  0.078
B: Default companies        
Mean 114200 0.177 0.100  -0.038
Median 89271 0.118 0.054  -0.001
Max 291358 0.666 0.715  0.171
Min. 30142 0.006 -0.120  -0.617
Std. Dev.  71465 0.147 0.138  0.119
C: F-Test of equal mean and 
variance between the sub-samples          
Mean 3.747
* 3.258
* 5.082
** 66.804
***
p-value  0.053 0.071 0.024 0.000
Variance 1.187 1.381
* 36.439
*** 2.343
***
p-value  0.300 0.052 0.000 0.000
Notes: A – shares of total assets, B – shares of current short-term liabilities. *, **, *** denote significance 
at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level, respectively.  
 10 
For the whole period, we have 1496 observations available for 667 SMEs. Of this 
number, 90 SMEs (6.0 per cent of observations) defaulted on their loan during the 
observation period. Among all Slovak banks, the average share of non-performing loans 
in total assets decreased from 24.3 per cent in 2000 to 7.2 per cent in 2004 (EBRD, 
2005a). Thus, the quality of the bank’s portfolio is above average. Since we expect 
loans to SMEs to be among the relatively more risky segments of the credit market, the 
quality must be significantly above average. However, loans to SMEs so far are only a 
very small fraction of the bank’s total loan portfolio. Even in an international 
comparison, the default rates we observe in our analysis are surprisingly low. For 
example, Altman and Suggit (2000) report average default probabilities for a five year 
period (measured by a similar indicator based on the number of issuers) of 4.6 per cent 
for loans to companies with an original S&P rating B and 23.5 per cent for companies 
with rating Caa.
7  
In each year, we have about 300 observations. However, there are only few 
SMEs with a longer history at the bank. Moreover, we do not have any information 
about them before and after the credit window. This is also true if the SMEs had had 
earlier credits provided by the bank analyzed. As a result, the average reported duration 
of the lending relationship between the SME and the bank in the last available period 
(January 2004-June 2005) is 2.6 years. This is largely comparable to an average loan 
length of 29 months as reported by EBRD (2005b). In total, 68 of 324 reported SMEs 
had continued to do business with the bank during the whole period. There are also few 
SMEs with credit relationships in only a few selected years of the whole period.  
Limited liability companies (denoted by S.R.O.) represent over half of the 
sample. Their default probabilities of approximately 5.4 per cent are slightly below the 11 
average. The joint stock companies (denoted by A.S.) and cooperatives represent 24 per 
cent and 20 per cent of the sample with default probabilities of approximately 7 per cent 
in both categories. Our data sample also involves 66 loans to private businesses of 
natural persons with only one single default (1.5 per cent). Finally, we have three loan 
cases of small state enterprises with no defaults.  
 
4.  Mortality Rates 
The seminal paper on measuring default risk is Altman (1989). Instead of deriving 
default rates he assesses the expected mortality of bonds in a way that actuaries measure 
the mortality of human beings. He relates his results to the pricing of bonds and finds 
that, after taking into account the mortality risk, return spreads are positive. The higher 
the risk of a bond, the higher this spread is. Altman (1989) proposes a mortality rate 
approach to measuring the risk of bonds according to their maturity, and Altman and 
Suggit (2000) apply this concept also to bank loans. They define marginal mortality rate 
(MMR) as  
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where the nominator, D, represents the total value of default loans and the denominator, 
C, represents the sum of all loans (including those of default companies) in period t = 1, 
…, T years after start of the loan. This concept considers various ways of terminating a 
loan in the previous years (in our case either full repayment or defaults). Thus, the 
marginal mortality rate is a more appropriate indicator for the risk assessment than 
simple average default rates.  12 
Figure 2 presents the resulting marginal mortality rates for the Slovak SMEs. 
Marginal mortality rates show that the loans are relatively safer in the first year after 
issue. Only 4.0 per cent of loans are not repaid in the first year after the approval, and 
the risk increases slightly to 5.5 per cent in the second year after the loan was granted. 
However, the risk of lending increases if the loan is not repaid within two years after the 
issue. The marginal mortality rate reaches its peak in the third year after the issue with 
nearly 10 per cent. This is revealed by comparably high cumulative mortality rates, 
CMR, which are defined as  
  () ∏
=
− − =
T
t
t T MMR CMR
1
1 1 .   (2) 
The cumulative mortality rate for the loans after two years of survival is 20 per 
cent (cumulative mortality rate over the whole period of five years is thus 27 per cent). 
However, we have to interpret these results carefully. On the one hand, at least some 
open loan operations will not be repaid after five years either, and this will further 
increase the cumulative mortality rate. On the other hand, our results for loans with 
longer maturity are based only on few observations.  
We can compare the behavior of marginal mortality rates with the pattern which 
Altman and Suggit (2000) report for large syndicated bank loans. They find relatively 
high default probabilities in the first two years after the issue. In contrast to their 
analysis, the loans in our sample are short-term loans. Therefore, we would expect that 
the default rates in our sample to be lower. Indeed, the default rates in our sample are 
slightly lower than of those Altman und Suggit (2000) report for firms with the 
speculative ratings (Caa). These results may indicate that some bad loans are refinanced 
for some time. Therefore, we do not restrict our analysis to matured loans only because 13 
this could bias the results downwards (see Asch, 1995). Unfortunately, we do not have 
any information on refinancing schedules of loans analyzed.  
 
Figure 2: Marginal Mortality Rates  
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5.  Factors Influencing the Probability of Default 
5.1. Estimation  
In centrally planned economies, entrepreneurship was not supported either with respect 
to allowing the private property, or in the management of state enterprises. Furthermore, 
the central planning system that was applied in Slovakia, which was a part of 
Czechoslovakia before 1993, was even more regulated than in several other countries of 
the region (Poland or Hungary). Therefore, management skills in this area were very 
restricted at the beginning of economic transition in 1990s. There was only a small 
group of employees with experience in the management of rather large state enterprises 14 
when economic life was fully controlled by the government. Most people did not have 
any experience of private business. Furthermore, their capital stock for starting new 
operations was not sufficient either. For SMEs, EBRD (2005a) show that low access to 
credit is one the most important business constraints on small private firms. This is not 
surprising as SMEs have a fundamentally different history than that of state-owned 
firms and therefore do not possess the networks and the political support that allows 
easy access to loans. Lízal and Švejnar (2001) find evidence of a soft budget constraint, 
mainly for the former state enterprises in the Czech Republic and Slovakia in the early 
reform years.  
We estimate several specifications of probit models for loan defaults of SMEs in 
Slovakia between January 2000 and June 2005 (that is, for five partially overlapping 
periods). Our dependent variable is the conditional probability at time t, given the 
available information set on the firm i time t – 1, Ω, that the firm defaults on its loan,  
  ( )
i
t
i
t
i
t t
i
t C q P ε γ β β + + + = Ω = − − − 1 1 2 1 1 | 1 Z ,   (3) 
where C denotes bank loans as a share of total assets and Z is a vector of control 
variables describing the performance of the SMEs with the corresponding coefficient 
vector  γ. We do not include any explanatory variables that characterize the bank 
structure, because all loans are reported by a single bank. However, we include time 
effects in selected specifications which may also reflect the business cycle and bank-
specific developments.  
Our data sample does not include companies without bank loans.
8 Nevertheless, 
the descriptive statistics in Table 1 show that the share of credits is relatively small on 
average (15 per cent of total liabilities). In turn, we have SMEs from those with nearly 
zero loans up to those with 85 per cent of total liabilities. Thus, this indicates that the 15 
selection bias should not play an overwhelmingly important role in our data set. 
Furthermore, the dummies for years, industries and legal forms are likely to reduce 
selection bias as well (see Djankov and Murrell, 2002).  
Equation (3) includes factors mentioned in the rich literature on enterprise 
restructuring in transition economies (see Djankov and Murrell, 2002), default 
probability estimations (see Chan-Lau, 2006), and credit scoring models (see Mester, 
1997). Bris et al. (2006) estimate a similar logit model of default recoveries in the US. 
Furthermore, the control variables follow the traditional literature on financial ratios and 
bankruptcies reviewed by Altman (1968) and Beaver (1966). However, our model 
concentrates on fewer variables than credit scoring models (see Mester, 1997, Berger et 
al., 2005) because we include only robust variables that can be also easily interpreted.
9  
Table 1 shows that the mean and variance of the selected financial ratios 
between the sub-samples are significantly different between the sub-samples of default 
and non-default SMEs. By contrast, there is only weak evidence that the mean or 
variance of bank loans are different between the two sub-samples.  
 
5.2. Effect of Financial Ratios 
According to hypothesis 1, firms are more likely to default the less liquid and the less 
profitable they are. Based on the existing literature on bankruptcy, we selected two 
control variables which are crucially important for the financial wealth of the firms. 
First, the SMEs that have of relatively higher cash amounts and finance available in 
their bank accounts (relative to total assets) are significantly less likely to default on 
their loans in the next 18 months than the rest of the sample. This variable reflects the 
liquidity and solvency channels. Second, companies that have high earnings before 16 
taxation (as a share of total assets) are also less likely to default on their loan in the 
following reporting period than the average of the sample. This channel indicates the 
profitability of the SMEs stressed in the earlier literature.  
From the point of view of the discussion on financial ratios, bank loans as a 
share of current short-term liabilities represent the debt factors of financial distress. 
Both the theoretical literature on agency problems and the empirical literature on the 
determinants of corporate bankruptcy, as formulated in hypotheses 3 and 1 respectively, 
suggest that more highly indebted firms are more likely to default. 
 17 
Table 2: Determinants of Loan Default, January 2000 – June 2005  
  P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9  P10  P11 
Cash and bank accounts
A -1.675
*** -0.116
*** -1.804
*** -0.099
*** -2.551
*** -0.060
*** -1.555
*** -0.117
*** -2.205
*** -2.571
*** -2.392
*** 
  (0.392) (0.019) (0.416) (0.017) (0.683) (0.020) (0.554) (0.034) (0.566) (0.673) (1.003) 
Bank loans
B 0.797
* 0.055
* 1.195
** 0.066
** -0.587 -0.014  1.733
*** 0.131
*** 0.791  1.474
* 2.948
** 
  (0.409) (0.029) (0.484) (0.028) (2.834) (0.066) (0.659) (0.050) (0.619) (0.809) (1.325) 
Earnings before taxation
A -4.612
*** -0.320
*** -5.214
*** -0.287
*** -7.691
*** -0.180
*** -3.561
*** -0.268
*** -5.294
*** -6.621
*** -4.865
*** 
  (0.728) (0.063) (0.815) (0.062) (1.421) (0.081) (1.127) (0.093) (1.042) (1.351) (2.063) 
Constant   -1.381
***   -1.073
***   -1.761
***   -1.720
***   -1.848
*** -1.475
*** -2.762
*** 
  (0.100)   (0.237)   (0.533)   (0.399)   (0.217) (0.431) (0.906) 
Estimation  method  Probit  D-Probit Probit  D-Probit Probit  D-Probit Probit  D-Probit  RE  RE  RE 
Industry  dummies    No  No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  No Yes Yes 
Time  dummies    No  No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  No Yes Yes 
Legal form dummies   No  No  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  No Yes Yes 
Credit size   All  All  All  All  Small  Small  Large  Large  All  All  Large 
Firm  random  effects    No No No No No No No No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number  of  observations  1496 1496 1496 1496  748  748  748  748 1496 1496  748 
Pseudo-R
2  0.134 0.134 0.183 0.183 0.290  0.290  0.144  0.144 ND ND ND 
Log-likelihood    -294.587 -294.587 -278.025 -278.025 -117.475 -117.475 -147.907 -147.907 -284.825 -268.069 -140.546 
Notes: A – shares of total assets, B – shares of current short-term liabilities. Small (large) credits are those below (above) the median of the credit share in current 
short-term liabilities. ND – not defined for panel probit, RE – random effects probit model. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 
5 and 1 per cent level, respectively.  18 
If banks have efficient credit evaluation tools for excluding the too risky firms in 
advance, and sufficient control or monitoring mechanisms over the activities of the 
SMEs during the duration of the loans, we would expect the influence of bank loans on 
defaults to be largely insignificant. By contrast, we find adverse and significant effects 
of bank loans (see specification P1 in Table 2) indicating that the creditor cannot 
enforce his controlling role, although the marginal change in the probability for an 
infinitesimal increase of bank loans (estimated by d-probit in specification P2) is 
relatively small compared to the effects of our control variables. Nevertheless, this 
effect is robust to the inclusion of time and industry dummies as well as the dummies 
indicating the legal form of the SMEs (see specifications P3 and P4).  
However, the positive coefficient may largely reflect the higher default 
probabilities of highly indebted SMEs (debt channel), while the banks still own 
relatively efficient tools for assessing the a priori risk. Therefore, we split the 
estimations into two parts, based on the share of loans to current short-term liabilities. In 
the first sub-sample (see columns P5 and P6), we include only SMEs with loans below 
the median level of loans (that is, approximately 12 per cent of current short-term 
liabilities). In fact, we see that bank loans are insignificant in this sub-sample. By 
contrast, we find a highly positive and significant coefficient for severely indebted 
SMEs (above 12 per cent of current short-term liabilities) in specifications P7 and P8.  
We also include random effects for the individual SMEs in specifications P9 and 
P10, although we have to keep in mind that we have only an unbalanced panel with a 
relatively short time dimension. Nevertheless, firm-specific effects cover all 
unobservable characteristics of the SMEs, and thus also reduce the possible selection 
bias (see Djankov and Murrel, 2002). This confirms the previous findings. In particular, 19 
the coefficient for bank loans is no longer significant, although it retains the positive 
sign, while all other determinants of defaults remain unchanged. It seems that 
unobservable firm-specific factors to a large extent explain the relationship between 
bank loans and defaults of the SMEs. However, default rates of large loans are also still 
positively related to bank loans also when we include firm-specific effects (specification 
P11). Thus, it seems that high indebtedness is of crucial importance for defaults. This 
result is consistent with the agency theory that incentives deteriorate in more highly 
indebted firms. 
We included sectoral effects to selected specifications of (3) in order to cover for 
possible differences between the economic sectors. On the one hand, such differences 
can be driven by the different nature of the business. On the other hand, a bank may 
specialize on particular sectors. In fact, one third of the credit cases analyzed is given to 
the SMEs active in the industrial sector, while de la Rocha (2001) reports that about 15 
per cent of firms are registered in industry. The difference is even larger for agriculture, 
which received about one quarter of all credits analyzed here although it represents less 
than six per cent of Slovak firms according to de la Rocha (2001). In turn, retail trade 
and other services might receive less credit than is their share in the economy (three 
quarters of all registered firms against about one third of the credits). However, those 
differences can be caused also by the higher need for the external financial funds in 
sectors with high fixed assets.  
Figure 3 shows the estimated sectoral effects for the one-digit NACE industries 
according to selected specifications (see Table 2, columns P3, P7, P10, and P11) of (3). 
Industrial SMEs, as the largest category, were selected as the base sector for 
comparisons. For our base probit specification (see column P3 in Table 2), the estimated 20 
effects confirm approximately equal default probabilities between the sectors. 
Nevertheless, retail trade seems to be more secure than industry, while we find higher 
sectoral default probabilities for agriculture, construction, and other services.  
However, the picture changes if we consider only large loans. Figure 3 shows 
that large loans in agriculture have much higher default probabilities than in any other 
sectors in Slovakia. This adverse effect in agriculture is also confirmed by panel probit 
estimation for large loans. In turn, the estimated effects for the remaining sectors also 
remain stable for different credit size and panel estimations.  
 
Figure 3: Estimated Sectoral Effects for Selected Specifications  
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Note: See Table 2, specifications P3, P7, P10 and P11 for details on the other explanatory variables. 
Industry is selected as the base for comparisons.  
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5.3. Incentive Structure and the Effects of Legal Forms 
Our starting descriptive analyses already show that the legal form determines the 
liability of a debtor (see Section 3). For legal entities, a minimum endowment with 
equity is mandatory, but only at a relatively low level for the SMEs. In turn, natural 
persons are fully liable and may lose all their personal assets if they fail. Choosing to 
operate a business as a legal entity may therefore be the deliberate choice by an 
entrepreneur to limit its liability. Liability, however, has important effects on incentives. 
Therefore, we expect that natural persons are less likely to default than legal bodies 
(hypothesis 2). 
Figure 4 confirms this hypothesis that natural persons are much less likely to 
default than other legal forms. However, the number (66 natural persons, of whon one 
defaulted) is possibly too low to draw final conclusions. The limited liability companies 
(S.R.O.) are slightly less risky than the joint stock companies (A.S.), according to our 
base probit specification. For large credits, however, the risk for the limited liability 
companies increases more than for the joint stock companies. The same behavior can be 
seen for panel probit for large credits.  
This may reflect the different legal standards of these types of companies. The 
limited liability companies can be founded with a nearly negligible value of starting 
capital (only SKK 200,000 or approximately EUR 5,000). Unlike the joint stock 
companies, the limited liability companies are not obliged to provide any public reports 
for their business activity. As a result, there is anecdotal evidence that limited liability 
companies are less confident business partners than any other types of business, and this 
is confirmed by our results.  
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Figure 4: Estimated Legal-Form Effects for Selected Specifications  
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Note: See Table 2, specifications P3, P7, P10 and P11 for details on the other explanatory variables. State 
enterprises and cooperatives are selected as the base for comparisons.  
 
6.  Conclusions  
We show that the loans to SMEs are a relatively well-performing segment of the credit 
market in Slovakia. On average, only 6.0 per cent of the SMEs defaulted on their loans 
between January 2000 and June 2005, which is generally comparable with developed 
markets.  
Our results are somewhat ambiguous with regard to the relationship between 
indebtedness and default. Although there is a positive correlation between the default 
probabilities and indebtedness, we show that this is not statistically robust for the whole 
sample if the possible selection bias is treated by the including industry and legal-form 
effects as well as firm-specific effects for individual companies. In contrast, for the 
firms with above average indebtedness we find that the positive relationship between 23 
default probabilities and higher indebtedness is significant. This implies that the debt 
burden may play a significant role for further development of the companies analyzed.  
With respect to the role of incentives, our results confirm that businesses of natural 
persons are much less likely to default than legal entities with restricted liability of their 
owners. This is consistent with the effects of full personal liability which provides 
proper incentives to debtors. Finally, our results confirm that higher profitability and 
higher liquidity lower the default probabilities of the SMEs significantly, as stated in the 
last hypothesis.  
Although our results may also be applicable to other countries of the region, we 
have to keep in mind that we are studying a period in which the development of loans to 
the SMEs has been relatively stable in Slovakia. Nevertheless, our results indicate that 
the risk of lending to SMEs is comparable to those in Western markets, but we also find 
important differences between sectors, legal forms and, especially, credit size. These 
differences indicate sources of risk in the expansion of credits to the SMEs. Thus, 
attempts to gain market shares may come at the cost of a higher risk. This might be the 
case especially if loan growth is achieved mainly by larger credits to both new or 
incumbent customers.  
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Endnotes  
1 For example, the costs of the East Asian financial crisis in 1997 are estimated at 25 – 50 per cent of 
GDP for Indonesia, Korea and Thailand. Even the banking crisis in Finland in 1991 had costs of more 
than 10 per cent of GDP. During the last decades, banking and financial crises occurred in most regions 
of the world (Honohan and Klingebiel, 2000). 
2 According to EBRD (2005b), an overwhelming majority (92 per cent) of loans to SMEs in Slovakia had 
to pledge collateral that was a high 150 per cent of the loan value. Nevertheless, the recovery rates of 
loans may be very different in individual cases. Unfortunately, our data set does not include any 
information on collateral. 
3 Moreover, a recent study shows that corporate failings are correlated (Das et al., 2006). New data are 
used to measure the costs of different bankruptcy procedures relative to each other (Bris, Welch and Zhu, 
2006, for the US, and Franks and Loranth, 2005, for Hungary). 
4 The debtors are unlikely to default if credits are already nearly repaid. The inclusion of those firms 
could bias the results in earlier years of the credit period.  
5 For comparison, the credits to private households grew by 28.9 per cent on average between 1999 and 
2005. In 2004 and 2005, growth rates reached 37 per cent and 41 per cent, respectively.  
6  Klapper et al. (2006) show that by using balance sheet data for the years between 1998 and 2002 
smaller SMEs in Poland tend to be more liquid.  
7 A broad comparison with the firms analyzed in this contribution may be given by the S&P rating of the 
long-run bank activities, which is BB. The SMEs (with no ranking available) instead could represent a 
rather more risky activity of the bank, which is then comparable with the latter firm group analyzed by 
Altman and Suggit (2000).  
8 According to EBRD (2005b), approximately 56 per cent of Slovak SMEs had no loans in 2005.  
9 Estimation results for a broader set of explanatory variables are available upon request from the authors.   
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